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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Rights policies are everywhere, in name or in form. Nearly every 
organization has both general equal-employment-opportunity policies and 
specific policies in particular areas, among them sex-harassment policies. Nearly 
every police department has highly specific policies on the use of force against 
citizens. Nearly every organization that maintains a children’s playground has 
some sort of safety policy. Over the last several years, I have studied the 
development and spread of these sorts of rights policies, with an eye to 
understanding why they have developed and why their administrative depth 
varies considerably from place to place. 
In answering these questions, I have found my thinking heavily influenced 
by three of Marc Galanter’s many contributions to legal scholarship. The first is 
his famous argument that “the ‘haves’ come out ahead”1 because they are 
organized to gain advantage in iterated legal contestation.2 The second is his 
equally famous argument that the so-called “litigation explosion” is all hot air: 
litigation rates have not increased appreciably and most injured people do not 
sue over their injuries.3 The third is a less famous, but equally perceptive and 
powerful observation: the diffuse and ambiguous signals sent by courts gain 
meaning in light of the knowledge, resources, and skills of parties to disputes.4 
Although at first glance these insights may seem unconnected, together they 
help to explain both the development and the continuing variation in rights 
policies in the United States. Before suggesting why, this article first discusses 
the nature of U.S. rights policies. 
II 
ADMINISTRATIVE-RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
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In the modern state, rights are empty promises in many contexts unless they 
are given life in administrative policies and practices. My research focuses 
specifically on administrative-rights policies within government, so the 
discussion here is limited to that context. Government policy is made and 
remade at the lowest levels of the administrative state where officials—police 
officers, social workers, development planners—give meaning to the often-
ambiguous goals set by legislatures, courts, and executives, and develop goals of 
their own. It is widely believed that in this process, bureaucracies generally 
dislike the limits imposed by legal rights and seek, in their administrative 
policies and practices, to undermine these rights. That overriding pessimism, 
while often justified, should be tempered: U.S. bureaucracies in some contexts 
have internalized a wide range of administrative policies and practices favoring 
protection for civil liberties and rights. 
Consider the example of policing. In 1960, the standard U.S. police-
department policy governing police officers’ use of force employed highly 
general restrictions on shooting at civilians, and shooting training consisted 
largely of target practice.5 The decision to shoot, in other words, was left to 
individual officers’ best judgment, despite considerable evidence that the 
decision to shoot varied widely among officers and often was influenced by the 
race of the target.6 With the benefit of hindsight, one can hardly imagine a more 
ambiguous policy and a training protocol less aimed at minimizing 
inappropriate uses of force. By 2000, the standard U.S. police policy on use of 
force specified a “graduated use of force” with specific itemizations of different 
levels of force—ranging from voice restraint to discharge of weapons—and the 
conditions under which each was legal and appropriate.7 Additionally, police 
training in the use of force has come to focus on correct application of the use 
of force continuum, and the best training programs also now teach officers how 
to defuse tense situations before resorting to the use of force.8 
The shift in policing from a general, vague policy on the use of force in 1960 
to a highly specific, training-focused policy in 2000 is nothing less than 
fundamental. And it is a shift that is characteristic of changes in U.S. 
administrative policies toward rights more generally. That is, in the decades 
after 1960 and in a host of policy areas, U.S. administrative governance became 
significantly, even dramatically, more rights-focused; the rights policies at the 
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heart of the change became institutionalized and integrated into government 
agencies in substantial administrative depth.9 
In some places, nonetheless, local bureaucracies have adopted few of these 
rights-based innovations, or they decline to enforce them—particularly with 
regard to vulnerable populations. The Chicago police department, for instance, 
is currently embroiled in a scandal involving allegations of systematic 
mistreatment of the residents of some public housing projects, and allegations 
that the department failed to enforce its elaborate rules on police misconduct.10 
The dominant theoretical explanation of administrative-rights policies views 
the policies as the expression of institutionalized models developed in the face 
of ambiguous threats from the legal environment, particularly threats of legal 
liability.11 In this view, the organizational field that adopts administrative-rights 
policies is itself the source of those policies. Thus, in the area of policing, it 
might be argued that police-use-of-force policies grow out of a dynamic within 
professional policing itself. Although my research on administrative-rights 
policies is informed by such an institutional theory, I have come to think that 
the standard focus on institutional norms within organizational fields should be 
supplemented by a focus on the generative role of organizational repeat players 
external to those organizational fields. My understanding of these issues reflects 
the influence of Marc Galanter’s contributions in three areas. 
III 
GALANTER’S FOUNDATIONAL INSIGHTS 
Marc Galanter pioneered a legal-realist interpretation of the dynamics of 
legal contestation and legal change over time. His classic article Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead (hereinafter Haves) hypothesized that the powerful 
prevail not only in politics, but in law as well.12 In contrast to some observers in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s who placed great hope in the transformational 
agenda of left-liberal public-interest litigation, Galanter warned that, over time, 
interests that are organized so as to maximize legal advantage, that have the 
organizational and financial capacities to “play for rules” (rather than for 
victories in particular cases), and that have ongoing familiarity with local 
jurisdictional rules, officials, and customs are likely to prevail over “one-shot” 
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litigants whose capacities in these areas are weak and whose time horizon is 
limited to the case at hand.13 
Regarding the impact of liability on administrative policies, one might 
naturally infer from Galanter’s argument that these policies, too, are likely to 
reflect the interests of the “haves.” One-shot tort litigants are likely to gain, at 
best, small-value buy-offs from private organizations and governments, in the 
form of run-of-the mill settlements. These small-value buy-offs are likely to 
generate, at best, only symbolic changes in organizational policies or, at worst, 
organizational changes that lead to more effective legal domination of one-shot 
litigants.14 Thus, in response to threats of liability, organizations may adopt 
symbolic policies (such as written employee policies that forbid sexual 
harassment), but they are unlikely to implement or enforce those policies.15 Or 
organizations may adopt policies and procedures that bring legal challenges 
against the organization into the organization, where they are processed (and 
rendered harmless to the organization) by internal grievance procedures.16 
On the other hand, Galanter’s classic Haves article has a second motif.17 It 
suggests that “have-not” parties might gain some of the advantages of the 
“haves” by developing repeat-player organizational capacities and longer-term 
legal strategies aimed at “playing for the rules,” rather than aiming only for 
short-term success in the case at hand.18 In particular, if the “have-nots” can 
develop organized litigation-support groups, long-term funding for litigation 
campaigns, and long-term strategies for legal change, then they may gain 
influence over the development of legal policy.19 If so, one might infer, as well, 
that the more organized and sustained the degree of legal challenge to an 
organization, the more greatly will the organization be forced to respond with 
more substantive changes to its policies and procedures. Thus, in the face of 
ongoing, sophisticated threats of legal liability, organizations may adopt 
changes that go far deeper than symbolic evasion or internal suffocation of legal 
complaints.20 
Overall, though, Galanter’s realist Haves argument suggests the hypothesis 
that the threat of tort liability may be less potent than assumed by the popular 
view. Legally experienced organizations, in this view, are likely to recognize 
that few people injured by their activities are likely to sue21 and that most of 
 13. Id. at 98–104. 
 14. See id. at 101–04. 
 15. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1436–37 (1990); see also 
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 11, at 1542–47. 
 16. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the 
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 952–53, 982 (1999). 
 17. See Charles R. Epp, Comment, The Two Motifs of “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” and Its 
Heirs, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1089 (1999). 
 18. Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 141–44. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 3, at 13–15. 
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these claims can be bought off relatively cheaply with settlements that leave the 
organization’s legal position no worse off.22 
Galanter’s famous intervention into the “litigation explosion” genre in 
Reading the Landscape of Disputes23 (hereinafter Landscape) is equally realistic, 
with equally significant implications for rights-policy development. To the 
complaint by many in the mid-1980s that the United States had experienced an 
explosion of lawsuits, particularly tort lawsuits, Galanter simply asked, “show 
me the numbers.” Thus, he compared rates of tort litigation in the United States 
with rates in the past; he compared injury rates with litigation rates (which were 
and are dramatically lower than rates of injury, meaning that most of the 
injured do not sue); and he compared litigation rates in the United States with 
rates in other countries.24 The results, though not a great surprise to social 
scientists working in the area, brought together the evidence in a remarkably 
clear, coherent, and forceful observation that there simply had been no 
litigation explosion.25 Galanter’s analysis in Landscape has been, by any 
standard measure of scholarly influence, remarkably influential. I recall 
teaching undergraduate courses a few years after its publication and, before it 
had percolated even in academia, finding my students uniformly committed to 
the “litigation explosion” idea. Upon introducing Galanter’s thesis, my students 
would reply, “It can’t be.” But surprisingly often they came around after 
carefully reading the article. Now, more than twenty years later, when I teach 
the topic, invariably some students anticipate my basic point, echoing 
Galanter’s analysis even before reading it. Might we all be so influential! 
More to the point, the implications of Landscape for understanding the 
development of rights policies are equally significant and profound and point in 
the same direction as Haves. If litigation rates have not increased appreciably in 
the United States, and if the overwhelming majority of complaints of injuries—
against abusive police officers, for instance—are “lumped,”26 then there is a 
remarkably weak incentive (at least in relation to the costs of injury), from the 
tort liability perspective, to reform injurious practices. The injured, by and 
large, not the injurer, lump their legal claims; it is the injured, then, who bear 
the costs of injuries. Litigation’s “bite” is muzzled. Organizations, in response to 
such impotent threats of being sued, are likely to adopt administrative policies 
on rights that are far less vigorous, reaching, and enforceable than if litigation’s 
bite were sharper and deeper. 
If we left the matter there, the implications of Galanter’s work for 
understanding administrative-rights policies, although important, would fit 
 22. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
 23. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 124–25 (describing “lumping” 
as inaction, where potential claimants do not make a claim because they lack information or access to 
information, or decide that litigation costs outweigh their benefits). 
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comfortably into a standard realist genre. But Galanter contributed another 
insight, with implications for the topic that are nothing short of profound. It is 
that incentives provided by law are best understood as “messages”—not 
constraints or inducements—and that these messages are likely to be 
interpreted in varying ways depending on the standpoint of the listener.27 
Specifically, “the messages disseminated by courts do not carry endowments or 
produce effects except as they are received, interpreted, and used by (potential) 
actors. Therefore, the meaning of judicial signals is dependant on the 
information, experience, skill, and resources that disputants bring to them.”28 
Although this observation is not nearly as famous as the two previously 
mentioned, some prominent scholars, notably Michael McCann, have relied on 
it in developing a constitutive theory of law.29 To put the matter bluntly, the 
meaning of judicial decisions as understood by academic experts is not what 
matters for how organizations interpret and use those decisions; what matters is 
how judicial decisions are understood by organizational officials. Therein lies an 
insight that threatens—potentially—to upend the implications drawn above 
from Galanter’s Haves and Landscape. 
If organizational officials believe that the United States has experienced a 
litigation explosion; if they believe that their constituents are highly litigious; if 
they believe that the liability terrain has shifted against their interests—in sum, 
if they believe that litigation’s bite is sharp and deep—then they are likely to act 
on the basis of that belief, and not on the contrary information known by realist 
academics. 
IV 
RESEARCH ON THE MEANING OF  
TORT LIABILITY FOR DEFENDANT ORGANIZATIONS 
The question immediately arising from the foregoing discussion is this: How 
do officials in defendant organizations interpret their liability environment, 
both with regard to the level of liability threat and the nature of the appropriate 
response? Remarkably little is known. In some areas of industry, product-
design engineers believe the messages from products-liability cases are so 
ambiguous and contradictory that they largely ignore the law and make design 
decisions on the basis of other factors.30 By contrast, human-resources specialists 
working for organizational employers have relatively specific understandings of 
the law on improper discharge of employees, believing the threat of litigation to 
 27. Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, supra note 4, at 126–28, 135–38. 
 28. Id. at 136. 
 29. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION 10 (1994); Michael McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 
732 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)); Michael McCann, Causal Versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the 
Difficulty of Being so Positive . . .), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457, 467–68 (1996). 
 30. GEORGE EADS ET AL., DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 108–09, 123–24 (1983). 
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be relatively high—but their understanding is contradicted by reports from 
academic, legal interpretations of the law.31 At least one line of research 
suggests the importance of examining in detail the perceptions held by 
organizational officials.32 
As part of a current project on the construction of administrative-rights 
policies by local governments, I have interviewed numerous local government 
administrators in Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and California. The localities 
vary in size, race and class diversity, rate of economic growth, and age of the 
public works and roads infrastructure. To get a long-term perspective on the 
legal environment of local government, I selected respondents who had served 
in local administration for a long time, typically several decades. These included 
mainly city managers and assistant city managers, but included as well several 
city attorneys, several attorneys in private practice who have represented cities, 
several risk managers, and several senior departmental managers. The 
interviews were semi-structured and open-ended. Standard question protocols 
were pursued in each interview, as well as in other questions that became 
appropriate in response to answers to the planned questions. The interviews 
were illuminating. 
A. Perceptions of the Threat of Litigation 
The senior managers interviewed for this study generally shared the popular 
belief that the frequency and costs of litigation in the United States are 
excessive, and they applied that belief to the local-government context. Typical 
observations by respondents included the following: 
“Our city is constantly being sued.”33 
“We’re constantly facing new lawsuits.”34 
“One thing or another is always under litigation.”35 
“The threat of litigation is always in the back of your mind.”36 
“What are we supposed to do with all of these lawsuits? If the courts are trying to send 
a message, hey, we’ve got it.”37 
These observations (and many others like them) suggest that local 
government administrators perceive that they face significant and substantial 
(and heightened) threats of liability. Thus, in comparison to empirical studies 
on trends in litigation rates, an element of exaggeration apparently affects 
managers’ perceptions of the extent of litigation. 
 31. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful 
Discharge, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 47, 64–68 (1993). 
 32. See, e.g., Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 11, at 1548–51. 
 33. Interview with respondent #M3 (Apr. 8, 1998). 
 34. Interview with respondent #M7 (Apr. 13, 1998). 
 35. Interview with respondent #M8 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
 36. Interview with respondent #M11 (Apr. 20, 1998). 
 37. Interview with respondent #M12 (Apr. 21, 1998). 
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B. Who Sues (and Who Matters) 
Each interview included a number of questions regarding which types of 
litigants are perceived as posing the most significant threats and as having the 
most significant effects on the policy or administrative process. Many of the 
respondents’ observations reflected an apparent recognition by administrators 
of the relative power of “repeat players” versus “one-shotters.” Respondents 
universally recognized the significance of the relative organizational “staying 
power” (as one put it) of a litigant or potential litigant. Organizational litigants, 
according to the respondents, nearly always must be taken seriously. In contrast 
to at least some one-shotters, their claims are likely to have some merit or basis 
and are likely to be advanced with sophistication; and such litigants are less 
likely simply to drop their claims. In the perceptions of senior local 
administrators, the organizations that must be taken seriously include not only 
business organizations, but also cause-advocacy organizations. Thus, one 
respondent made a typical observation: 
It’s tougher to deal with advocacy organizations than with individual lawyers. Their 
constituency base gives them strength, and also means that they have to deal with their 
constituents if they compromise too much. They also have more funding typically than 
individual lawyers, and thus they can give you a tougher fight, can carry it on longer. 
Also, more publicity is generated when an organization is involved—they like to go to 
the media, whereas individual lawyers don’t—and then it’s tougher to come to an 
agreement. So I’d much rather deal with an individual lawyer than with an 
organization.38 
On the other hand, virtually all of the managers observed that individual 
lawyers representing run-of-the-mill plaintiffs posed the potential for serious 
disruption of city policy. Being a one-shotter, and even a relatively ordinary 
one, does not appear necessarily, or even commonly, to place a claimant in a 
“not-to-be-taken-seriously” category—but only if the one-shotter is legally 
represented.39 As one respondent observed, “All litigants have staying power if 
they have an attorney, because most of the time the attorney will be working on 
a contingency basis, and so the expenses aren’t out of the plaintiff’s pocket.”40 
Additionally, the senior administrators interviewed for this study universally 
emphasized significant changes over the last thirty-five years in the capacity of 
litigants. The biggest change, in their perception, has been a broadening of the 
universe of those who sue or threaten to do so. Thirty-five years ago, the 
managers observed, the universe was limited mainly to businesses or real-estate 
developers either doing business with localities or developing property within 
localities. By the 1970s, businesses were joined by an increasingly diverse range 
of individuals and groups, particularly antidevelopment forces, including 
neighborhood associations, historical preservationists, environmentalists, civil-
rights and civil-liberties claimants, and a wide diversity of individuals claiming 
 38. Interview with respondent #M6 (Apr. 10, 1998). 
 39. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 114. 
 40. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
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personal injuries. The change, in the view of several respondents, has been 
dramatic: “Now almost anybody can get a lawyer to take a case; it didn’t used to 
be that way.”41 
Nonetheless, several of the managers, particularly those in rural or more-
isolated cities, made observations suggesting that the expansion and 
diversification of the threat of liability may vary significantly by geographical 
area. For instance, a lawyer who has both represented cities and sued them 
observed, “You know those cops that get fired in the cities because of brutality? 
You know where they end up? You think they become garbage collectors? No. 
They just get hired as cops in these small towns out here where the rules are 
more relaxed and nobody’s going to sue them.”42 
Similarly, a manager in an isolated town said, “There aren’t a lot of personal 
injury lawyers here. We don’t get sued very much. The last time it happened, 
the lawyer was somebody from out of town. I can’t remember where he was 
from—I think one of the bigger cities down the road.”43 
In sum, senior public managers’ perceptions about who represents a 
potential litigation threat are revealing: the universe of perceived sources of 
liability threat has become surprisingly broad and diverse. Some administrators 
emphasized repeatedly that “anybody” can get a lawyer. That perception 
reveals a sort of democratization of the perceived threat of litigation. 
Nonetheless, that perceived democratization of threat is not all-pervasive. Even 
in urban areas, several managers emphasized that organizational litigants 
typically have more staying power than individual litigants and thus pose 
greater threats. Moreover, the handful of rural or geographically isolated 
respondents interviewed for this study seemed to hold much lower perceptions 
of the significance of liability litigation than did their urban counterparts. 
C. Administrative Policy Responses 
The respondents identified a number of forward-looking, defensive policies 
and actions taken by their organizations in order to minimize legal threats. 
First, as may be expected, they universally observed that the role of lawyers in 
the policy and administrative process has expanded. As one respondent noted, 
When I first started this game, you’d bring lawyers in only occasionally, if some 
outside party raised a legal concern. Now the city’s lawyers are in on every single 
policy discussion, at every stage of the discussion. And if there are high-level 
discussions, say between a department head and the city manager, a third person—a 
lawyer—is always present. And it is the lawyer who makes the presentation. Not the 
policy expert.44 
A second significant, forward-looking effect observed by virtually all the 
respondents is what may be called a “systematization of procedures.” In the 
 41. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
 42. Interview with respondent #L2 (Apr. 16, 1998). 
 43. Interview with respondent #M19 (Aug. 21, 1998). 
 44. Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
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area of risk management, this is especially evident. The respondents in each 
jurisdiction reported that their government had begun systematically checking 
infrastructure thought to pose safety or accident risks—checks, for instance, of 
road signs, road conditions, sewer lines, and park and playground equipment. In 
each instance, the senior managers emphasized that the key to such 
systematization is precise recordkeeping of the nature and timing of both the 
checks and the actions taken in response to observed problems. Such 
systematization, particularly in recordkeeping, they observed, helps to insulate 
the organization from liability. A closely related development is the 
systematization of procedures governing relations between the citizen and the 
local government. For instance, systematic procedures have been instituted for 
approval of (and objections to) development permits, for complaints about 
police activity, for injury- or property-damage claims, for discrimination claims, 
and for investigations of these claims. Thus, a typical observation is as follows: 
The threat of litigation leads to more systematic planning and documentation. Now we 
have employees do regular trips down all county roads to check for problems in the 
road or missing signs. And we document those trips. So if a sign comes up missing and 
causes an accident, we can show that we’d taken steps to avert that problem and that 
the problem hadn’t been present in the previous regular check. Years ago, of course 
we’d be concerned about road conditions and missing signs. But mainly we’d correct 
problems when a call came in, or when an employee happened to notice it. Now the 
program is more regular, more systematic, and more documented.45 
A third forward-looking effect of heightened legalization has been the 
institution of regularized training for new employees, and, for some types of 
employees—particularly the police—periodic continuing training. The types of 
training run the gamut. In most of the jurisdictions included in this study, 
employees receive training regarding prohibited forms of discrimination, 
particularly sex and race discrimination, and harassment. Relatedly, several 
respondents emphasized that their governments had adopted “zero tolerance” 
policies toward harassment. Police receive training in constitutional law 
covering search, seizure, pursuit, arrest, and use of force. Public-works 
employees receive training in identifying and reporting problems with streets, 
sidewalks, road signs, and other parts of the infrastructure. The extent and rigor 
of such training obviously varies. Nonetheless, the senior managers interviewed 
for this study universally stressed that an increased emphasis on training has 
been among the most important effects of legalization. Even without prodding, 
several identified it as the most significant effect.46 One respondent, in sum, tied 
all of the defensive policies and actions together: “Responding to the whole 
litigation area is like a comprehensive program: you need a comprehensive 
policy that covers everything, from getting good legal advice, to planning for 
 45. Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
 46. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998); 
Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
 Spring 2008] IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 51 
 
known risks, to training employees, to insurance coverage, to being responsive 
to citizens’ complaints.”47 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The observations from interviews presented here are only suggestive, but 
are potentially significant for understanding administrative-rights policies. As 
institutional theories of organizational policies might suggest, organizational 
managers perceive appropriate rights policies in light of their understanding of 
their legal environment. But this understanding, at least in the public sphere, is 
shaped not only by dominant institutional models, but also by very specific 
perceptions of the liability threat in their locality. And these perceptions are 
best understood in light of Marc Galanter’s theoretical contributions regarding 
repeat-player litigants, the so-called litigation explosion, and the role of litigant 
capacity in shaping understandings of the meaning of law.48 
As Galanter suggested, the diffuse messages sent by courts gain meaning in 
light of the perceptions, knowledge, skills, and resources of potential 
disputants.49 In the governmental context, senior administrators share some 
aspects of Galanter’s legal realism: administrators see liability as a greater 
threat to the extent that a potential claimant is supported by organizational 
resources and has “staying power.”50 Moreover, they seem to recognize that 
many potential claimants lack these capacities and are unlikely to sue or, if they 
sue, are unlikely to represent a significant legal threat.51 
On the other hand, senior local-government administrators share some 
aspects of the naïve, popular view of litigation that Landscape sought to 
debunk. They claim to fear widespread litigation and claim that litigation rates 
against their governments have virtually exploded. In response, they say that 
their governments have adopted “comprehensive systems” of administrative 
policies aimed at minimizing governmental harms to protected rights, via 
clarified policies, improved training, and improved internal oversight.52 
Nonetheless, some administrators, typically those in geographic areas distant 
from urban centers, say that the threat of liability is rare and, quite literally, 
distant.53 In these contexts, administrative-rights policies appear to be 
significantly less developed than in contexts where the perception of liability is 
greater. 
 47. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998). 
 48. See discussion supra Part III. 
 49. Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, supra note 4, at 126–28, 135–38. 
 50. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M6 (Apr. 10, 1998). 
 51. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998); 
Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
 52. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 53. Id. 
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If these hypotheses are supported by more systematic research, then 
organizational-rights policies are possibly influenced not only by dominant 
institutional norms, but also by highly specific liability threats related to the 
efforts of repeat-player litigants. 
